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Abstract 
The twelve refereed publications which form the basis of this PhD each deal with the impact 
of regulatory change on the perceptions and behaviours of key participants.  The publications 
are drawn from three collaborative research projects exploring different aspects of financial 
reporting, auditing and corporate governance regulation.  
The first project considered the way in which a new regulatory enforcement body, the 
Financial Reporting Review Panel interpreted its role and the impact of its actions on 
preparers and auditors of financial statements.  The second project reviewed the developing 
perceptions of preparers, regulators and auditors following the European Commission 
announcement that IFRS would be adopted for the consolidated accounts of all EU listed 
companies with effect from 2005.  The third project explores the impact of the re-regulation 
that followed the Enron and Worldcom scandals.  In particular it examines auditor / client 
financial reporting and auditing interactions and presents evidence on the role taken by the 
newly empowered audit committee in that process.   All of the publications present the results 
of empirical evidence.  While a wide range of research methods are used, interviews and 
questionnaire surveys dominate.  All of the publications are policy relevant and 
recommendations are made in each paper.  Although all the research has been undertaken in a 
UK setting, the issues are explored within the framework of international literature, and most 
of the findings and recommendations are of international significance. 
The first part of this commentary provides an overview of the contribution and quality of the 
work being submitted.  The publications are then located within the broad sweep of 
regulatory theory to demonstrate the coherence of the submission.  Each of the three projects 
is then considered in turn and the contribution to knowledge of each of the publications is 
then discussed in detail, and summarised in the conclusion.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction and outline of research 
The Basis of the Submission 
This thesis is based on publications which have explored the impact of regulatory change on 
accounting and auditing practices in the UK.  The work has come out of three substantial 
projects: 
1. Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP). Funded by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), the project explored how this 
enforcement body achieved its aims; 
2. Introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  The European 
Commission (2000) proposed that all European Union (EU) companies listed on a 
regulated market should prepare their consolidated accounts using international 
accounting standards by 2005.   The aim of the project was to study the developing 
perceptions of key parties during the time leading up to this substantial change; 
3. Impact of post-Enron re-regulation on the nature and outcomes of interactions 
between auditors and directors of listed companies.  This project was funded by the 
ICAEW.  
The work submitted for this thesis consists of twelve publications: seven papers published in 
refereed academic journals, three refereed monographs / bulletins published by the ICAEW, 
one book chapter and a research book (see appendix one). 
The papers selected for inclusion in this thesis:  (1) contain primary research, (2) make a 
contribution to knowledge, theory and practice (3) make a contribution to future policy, and 
(4) are of international relevance. 
Their primary contribution to knowledge was to provide: 
1. The first published evidence on how the body responsible for enforcing accounting 
standards, the FRRP, interpreted its role and its broader impact on the regulatory framework.  
As well as reviewing its direct actions and how they portrayed themselves, the research 
examined the wider implications of its activities on auditor independence, professional 
2 
 
discipline, company share prices and perceptions of key parties. It provided evidence based 
recommendations on the FRRP’s future role. 
2. Evidence on how the attitudes of knowledgeable individuals on the EU introduction of 
IFRS developed over time and how they perceived the competition among private interests. 
3. Evidence on the impact of the UK post-Enron regulatory reforms on the resolution of 
financial reporting issues and the extent to which audit committees and their chairs are 
involved in both these and audit related interactions. It also explored the joint provision of 
audit and non-audit services, perceptions of audit quality and the regulatory framework. The 
research is relevant to global regulators re-considering the future shape of the regulatory 
framework as a consequence of the recent financial crisis. 
My Personal Research Background 
Although I am educated to masters level in economics, my accounting background is 
essentially professional.  I am a qualified chartered accountant (FCA) and spent four years as 
an auditor for one of the larger accountancy firms and a further two years as a financial 
controller in a growing small and medium sized enterprise (SME).   Since my appointment as 
a university lecturer my understanding of the subject has been broadened by attending 
conferences and reading contemporary academic literature. However, I remain convinced that 
accounting is essentially a practical subject and research questions should have real world 
relevance.   My interest in how regulation changes impact on perceptions and behaviour flow 
out of these beliefs.  My professional background has given me a firm grasp of the regulatory 
complexities that surround financial reporting and auditing and provided me with the 
credibility to discuss these issues with other professionals.  I have been keen to focus on 
research approaches that capitalise on these comparative advantages, notably interviews. My 
approach to research is pragmatic, following a middle ground between positivist and social 
constructivist traditions, drawing on quantitative and qualitative techniques depending on the 
nature of the research question. 
Publications Submitted 
The publications are presented in chronological order with a brief indication of their specific 
contribution: 
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(1) Brandt, R., Fearnley, S., Hines, T. and Beattie, V. (1997) “The Financial Reporting 
Review Panel:  An analysis of its activities” in Financial Reporting Today – Current and 
Emerging Issues 1998.   London: Accountancy Publications, 27-54. 
Originality / value - First systematic review of publicly available evidence on the activities 
of FRRP since its inception in 1991 contributing to an understanding how the FRRP 
interprets its role and the wider impact of its actions.   
(2) Hines, T., McBride, K. and Page, M. (1999) “An investigation into the stock market 
reaction to press notices issued by the Financial Reporting Review Panel.”  Journal of 
Applied Accounting Research, 5 (2), 54-83.  
Originality / value: First published share price event study on the impact of FRRP press 
notices on companies that had been the subject of an investigation. 
(3) Fearnley S., Hines T., McBride K. and Brandt R. (2000) “Problems and politics of 
regulatory fragmentation:  The case of the Financial Reporting Review Panel and the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.”  Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance. 8 (1), 16-35.  
Originality / value: Identified inconsistencies in the way in which the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales dealt with disciplinary cases drawn to its attention by the 
FRRP and attempted to suggest why they may have occurred and made recommendations for 
the future.  
(4) Fearnley S., Hines T., McBride K., and Brandt R. (2000) “A Peculiarly British 
Institution.  An Analysis of the Contribution Made by the Financial Reporting Review Panel 
to Accounting Compliance in the UK.”  London: Centre for Business Performance, Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.  
Originality / value: Provides a comprehensive and updated review of FRRP activities and 
their relevance to the regulatory framework.  Provides evidence based recommendations on 
the FRRP’s future role. 
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(5) Hines T., McBride K. and Fearnley S. (2001) “We’re off to see the wizard: An evaluation 
of directors’ and auditors’ experiences with the Financial Reporting Review Panel.”  
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability, 14 (1), 53-84. 
Originality / value: Provides a richer understanding of the way in which the FRRP has 
operated, by comparing its stated aims, objectives and procedures with the perceptions of 
company directors and auditors with direct experience of it.  It is concluded that the FRRP 
has engaged in ‘myth-making’. 
(6) Fearnley S., Hines T., McBride K. and Brandt R. (2002) “The impact of the Financial 
Reporting Review Panel on aspects of the independence of auditors and their attitudes to 
compliance in the UK.” British Accounting Review (34), 109-139. 
Originality / value: Provides insights into how the FRRP achieves its objectives, especially 
the reaction of the auditor when a client’s company is being investigated by the FRRP and its 
impact on the audit firm and individual partners concerned. 
(7) Fearnley S., Gillies A., Hines T. and Willett C. (2007) “Bewildered but better informed: 
A qualitative, interview based study into the views of accountants and regulators prior to the 
introduction of IFRS in the UK.” Accepted for ICAEW website 
(http://www.icaew.com/index.cfm?route=112935 ). Retrieved 13 June 2007. 
Originality / value: This study was one of the first to identify attitudes of key parties on 
critical issues related to a substantial regulatory change and how they had developed over 
time. 
(8) Fearnley S. and Hines T. (2007) “How IFRS has destabilised financial reporting for UK 
non-listed entities.” Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 15 (4), 394-408.  
Originality / value: The paper identifies the changing views in the UK of the suitability of 
IFRS for non-listed entities, a group largely ignored in the big policy debates about IFRS. 
(9) Beattie V., Fearnley S. and Hines T. (2009) “The impact of changes to the non audit 
services regime on finance directors, audit committee chairs and audit partners of UK listed 
companies” London: Centre for Business Performance, ICAEW.  
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Originality / value: This publication provides evidence on the impact of post-Enron 
regulatory reforms on the joint provision of audit and non-audit services to clients and made 
an important contribution to the debate about whether further restrictions were justified.   
(10) Beattie V., Fearnley S. and Hines T. (2011) “Reaching Key Financial Reporting 
Decisions: How Directors and Auditors Interact”, Chichester: Wiley. 
Originality / value:  The analysis of the case studies and the cross case analysis in the book 
provides the only publicly available evidence of how financial reporting outcomes are 
achieved in the recent UK regulatory environment. A revised grounded theory interaction 
model is developed for the revised framework.    
(11) Beattie V., Fearnley S. and Hines T. (2012) “Do UK audit committees really engage 
with auditors on audit planning and performance?” Accounting & Business Research, 42 (3), 
1-27. 
Originality / value: This is the first wide-ranging survey to be carried out in any jurisdiction 
that explores the relative engagement of the audit committee chair (ACC), audit committee 
(AC), audit partner (AP) and chief finance officer (CFO) in audit planning and in audit 
performance and finalisation issues.  It provides evidence to policymakers who may be 
considering a review of the AC role.  
(12) Beattie V., Fearnley S. and Hines T. (2013) “Perceptions of actors affecting audit 
quality in the Post-Sox UK regulatory environment.” Accounting & Business Research, 43 
(1), 56-81. 
Originality / value: The paper provides the only published evidence on the perceptions of 
three key preparer groups on how the post-Enron regulatory regime has impacted on audit 
quality.   The findings also provide valuable evidence to inform the debate on future policy in 
relation to the role of audit and audit quality.   
All of the research is joint authored.  With the sole exception of publication 5, where I am 
the lead named author, the authorship of the publications has been listed alphabetically, 
indicating that the contribution from the authors has been broadly equal.  My contribution to 
the research in all cases was significant (see appendix 2).    
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Quality of Research 
1. Citations. It is generally accepted that the number of citations is an indicator of the quality 
and relevance of published research, but it is a measure that needs to be used with some 
caution.  For recent publications, such as 10 to 12 above, there will have been little 
opportunity for citation.  A full list of citations for each submitted publication is provided in 
Appendix three, but a summary is provided below: 
Table 1 
Publication Reference Date of Publication Number of Citations 
(excluding self citations)  
Publication 1 1997  6 
Publication 2 1999  8 
Publication 3 2000  5 
Publication 4 2000 10 
Publication 5 2001 32 
Publication 6 2002 14 
Publication 7 2007 1 
Publication 8 2007 6 
Publication 9 2009 5 
Publication 10 2011 3 
Publication 11 2012 0 
Publication 12 2012 2 
Source: Google Scholar,11 April 2013. 
Furthermore, the source of the citations is also an indicator of the quality and policy 
relevance of the research.  Publications 9, 10 and 12 were all cited by House of Lords Select 
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Committee on Economic Affairs report on ‘Auditors: Market Concentration and their Role, 
Second Report of Session 2010-11’. 
2. Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) Submissions 
This is another indicator of the quality of the research.  Publications included as part of the 
University’s submission for a particular subject area have undergone a process of internal and 
external peer review. 
For RAE 2001, publications 1, 3 and 4 were included with another refereed journal article 
which has not been included in this thesis. 
For the RAE 2008, publications 5, 6 and 8 were included with another refereed journal 
article which has not been included in this thesis. 
Publications 9, 10, 11 and 12 fall in the time period covered by the Research Excellence 
Framework (REF) 2013, for which preparations are ongoing. 
3. Quality of Journals 
Journal rankings also provide a widely accepted indicator of the quality of a published paper.  
The most frequently quoted journal ranking system in the accounting field is ABS which 
ranks the relevant journals for the submitted publications as follows: 
3*- Accounting, Auditing and Accountability (publication 5) 
     British Accounting Review (publication 6) 
    Accounting & Business Research (publications 11 and 12) 
2*- Journal of Applied Accounting Research (publication 2) 
1*- Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance (publications 3 and 8). 
Three of the submitted works (publications 4, 7 and 9) have been published by the leading 
UK professional accountancy body, the ICAEW, having previously been subject to their 
review process.  The book (publication 10) utilised an independent publisher but the ICAEW 
endorsed the work by permitting us to use their logo on the front cover. 
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4. Funded Research 
All the publications with the exception of 7 and 8 are outputs from projects funded by the 
ICAEW.  While research funding is not a guarantee that the final outputs from a project meet 
a quality threshold, it does indicate that the original research question was considered 
sufficiently relevant and interesting to justify support by the academic and professional 
referees.  
The rest of the commentary 
Chapter two locates the submitted publications within theories of regulation in order to 
demonstrate the coherence and contribution of the submission.  Chapters three to five focus 
on the contribution that each of the three projects has made to knowledge.  Finally chapter six 
concludes and provides a summary justification for the award. 
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Chapter two 
Theories of Regulation 
Public interest case for regulation 
Baldwin and Cave (1999) identify a number of justifications for regulatory intervention into 
free markets, but all can be characterised as correcting some form of market failure.  
Economists view accounting information as a public good, whereby consumers who pay for 
goods cannot exclude others, free-riders, who have not borne part of the cost, also benefit 
(Musgrave, 1969). Regulation is needed to reduce the impact of information asymmetries. 
Adverse selection will occur as buyers will pay an average price for average quality and 
sellers of high quality products will withdraw (Akerlof, 1970).   
Regulation also supports network effects, where a good or service becomes more valuable to 
one individual if others also acquire it.  This is due to increasing returns for accumulated 
information, learning effects and economies of scale.  Accounting information has these 
characteristics and attempts to introduce global harmonisation of financial reporting can be 
viewed from this perspective.   
Therefore a major objective of accounting regulation is to guarantee fairness for investors and 
to protect them against fraud and exploitation.  It is therefore very wide-ranging, covering not 
only what information should be disclosed, how frequently, how it should be presented, who 
should receive it, but also broader issues such as regulation over the role and competence of 
auditors. 
Alternative economic perspectives on regulation 
The arguments for regulation advanced above focus on protection of the public interest and   
assume that regulators have sufficient information and enforcement powers and are 
sufficiently benevolent to promote the public interest.  This view has been criticised on a 
number of counts.  There is no objective basis for identifying the public interest.  The 
assumption that regulators act as neutral arbiters has also been questioned.  Also it is not clear 
how interaction of participants in the political process will lead to maximisation of economic 
welfare (Posner, 1974).  Private interest theories of regulation view it as the product of 
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relationships between different interest groups and the state and there is competition for 
power.   
Stigler (1971) proposes that regulatory agencies are eventually captured by producers in the 
regulated industry because they are utility maximisers and to maintain political power they 
need votes and money, resources that can be provided by groups affected by regulatory 
decisions.  Becker (1985) argues all actors are rational individual maximisers of their own 
welfare, but that some groups are better able to exert political pressure than others.  Wealth 
transfers will take place from less efficient to more efficient groups.  Indeed it is likely that 
the political process will primarily involve interest groups, as for individuals it will be too 
costly to form opinions and make representations on political issues.  Depending on the 
efficiency of the political process, social welfare either increases or decreases.  In some cases 
the economic damage from market failure may be less costly than regulation.   
Broader theories of regulation 
Increasingly regulation theorists reject the approach of economists who assume regulation is 
shaped by individual rational actors.   Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2010) note that while 
theories of regulation were previously monopolised by economists with occasional 
contributions from the public law tradition, it has now become a multi-disciplinary field.  
They note that substantial contributions to regulatory debates are now made by political 
scientists, lawyers, sociologists, anthropologists and others.  The move away from traditional 
‘command and control’ forms of regulation to more fragmented and decentralised structures 
has highlighted the limitations of economic welfare theories.  They also argue that new 
technologies, products, actors and changing consumer preferences are increasing the rate of 
new regulatory challenges. 
Black (2002) argues that the communicative interactions that occur between all involved in 
the regulatory space are an important part of most regulatory systems.  Discourse analysis 
suggests that interactions may be the basis of important functions such as co-ordination. 
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) have argued that regulators should be responsive to industry 
structures because different structures will be conducive to different degrees and forms of 
regulation.  Efficient regulation needs to take account of different motivations of affected 
individuals and institutions, while the regulations themselves can impact on structures and 
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motivations. This means that the most appropriate form of regulation will depend on context, 
regulatory culture and history.  Accounting academics (e.g. Puxty, Wilmott, Cooper and 
Lowe, 1987; Nobes and Parker, 2001) have noted that regulation has been shaped according 
to contrasting histories, cultures and paths of development.   
Publication 12 considers the impact of re-regulation following the Enron scandal on 
perceptions of audit quality in the UK among audit partners, listed company chief financial 
officers and audit committee chairs.  Many of the regulatory changes were considered to have 
had only a slight or moderate impact on audit quality consistent with Hirshleifer’s (2008) 
view that there is a psychological bias in favour of regulatory interventions. 
Publication 7 reviews the move to IFRS convergence in the light of interest group theory 
employing Hancher and Moran’s (1989) concept of regulatory space.  It also considers 
developing perceptions of the IFRS project in this context.   Publication 8 explores the 
impact of IFRS adoption on a group who demonstrably lost out in the fight for regulatory 
influence – UK non-listed entities.  The two publications contribute to the development of a 
theoretical framework for an increasingly common form of regulation - that produced by a 
supra-national body outside of national jurisdiction but within a framework of globalisation.  
Regulatory enforcement 
Economic theory would suggest that deterrence from violating regulations will only be 
achieved if the costs of those violations, multiplied by the probability of detection are equal 
to or greater than the benefits to be gained from the violations (Becker, 1968).  Baldwin & 
Cave (1999) identify different enforcement strategies.  The deterrence approach tends to be 
more direct and tougher with prosecutions used to deter future infractions.  In contrast the 
compliance approach is more flexible, usually cheaper, less confrontational and encourages 
compliance.  Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2010) note that compliance theories have been 
further refined by researchers from other traditions.  For example, Gunningham and 
Grabosky (1999) believe that a wider range of measures should be employed such as 
education and information based strategies in order to deliver the desired results in the least 
burdensome way. 
These insights are employed in both publication 1 and publication 4 which review the 
actions of the FRRP in the first years following its establishment in 1991 with the aim of 
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drawing some initial conclusions regarding its effectiveness as an enforcement regulator, how 
it achieves its aims and whether revisions are needed to equip it for future challenges.  The 
impact of a regulator does not solely depend on its direct actions but on its wider impact on 
society, issues also explored in publications 1 and 4 above.  Publication 2 specifically 
considers whether publication of a company specific press notice by the FRRP was 
considered by the markets to contain new information and therefore impacted on that 
company’s share price.  Publication 6 uses Kohlberg’s (1969) stage sequence model of 
cognitive moral development to examine the impact of the FRRP on auditor independence 
and how it has changed attitudes to compliance.   
Institutional theory rejects explanations that focus on the individual and argues that 
institutional structure and arrangements as well as social processes shape regulation and 
therefore need to be understood.  Regulatory processes do not necessarily match the market 
failures they are supposed to remedy (Breyer, 1982).  Organisations may be formed and 
operate in such a way as to appear to accommodate societal expectations without necessarily 
dealing rigorously with the problems (Fogarty, Zucca, Meonske and Kirch, 1997) and a 
failure to meet these expectations may threaten their survival (Fogarty, 1996).  Publication 5 
explores the work of the Financial Reporting Review Panel from the perspective of 
institutional theory and suggests that it has engaged in ‘myth making’ to promote its 
perceived legitimacy (Ritti and Silver, 1986).  The theoretical framework used in this paper 
has been subsequently applied to a wide variety of settings (see chapter 3). 
Self regulation has been a significant feature of accounting regulation, particularly in the UK.  
Professional associations are employed by the state to monitor and enforce against their 
members.  However, rules written by self-regulators may be self-serving and contravention 
may be difficult to demonstrate, so questions of openness, transparency and accountability of 
process arise.  Publication 3 reviewed how the ICAEW responded to cases referred to it as a 
consequence of FRRP cases.   
The FRRP is a private sector body with power delegated from the state, a framework which is 
particularly European in nature.  Publications 1 to 6 therefore have made a strong 
contribution to the development of theories about shared regulatory authority.  
 
13 
 
Auditing regulation 
Auditing regulation must be considered in conjunction with accounting regulation as auditors 
bear prime responsibility for enforcing accounting rules.  The prime purpose of external audit 
is to reduce agency costs by monitoring the financial statements issues by management to 
shareholders.  The position of the auditor creates a new agency problem with threats of moral 
hazard and collusion.  Therefore the enforcement of accounting rules by auditors has to be 
supervised and incentives have to be provided to support the independence of auditors.  
Publication 9 evaluates the extent to which post Enron regulatory changes have impacted on 
perceptions and behaviour regarding non-audit services (NAS) being supplied by the audit 
firm.   
Corporate governance 
‘Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled’ 
(Cadbury Report, 1992).  The external auditor is a key corporate governance mechanism, but 
the audit committee has been given increased responsibilities with the post-Enron regulatory 
reforms.  The audit committee has to oversee the auditors as well as having an oversight role 
over management.   There has been relatively little direct research into how ACs interpret 
their role.   Publication 11 investigated the extent to which the AC, ACC and other key 
parties are aware of / involved in discussions about a range of audit related issues.  
Publication 10 further extends the work on interactions with an exploration of how the 
largely unobservable financial reporting and auditing process in UK listed companies actually 
works in the current UK regulatory environment.  It examines how CFOs, ACCs and APs 
interact with each other to reach agreement on key financial reporting issues as the financial 
statements are finalised.  It tests the grounded theory previously developed in a different 
setting (Beattie, Brandt and Fearnley, 2001) before the regulatory framework was 
substantially changed by global harmonisation initiatives and post-Enron re-regulation.  It 
was clear that the influences on interaction outcomes which had previously been identified as 
crucial (e.g. quality of relationships, company circumstances) were now peripheral and 
therefore publication 10 developed a new grounded theory to explain how financial reporting 
issues are resolved in the revised regulatory setting.  The process of enforcing accounting and 
auditing standards had been strengthened and this was now the dominant influence shaping 
outcomes.  The study demonstrates that regulation is complex and fragmented, particularly in 
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accounting where different regulators with different spheres of influence overlap with one 
another.  It also illustrates the context specific dynamic nature of regulation (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992). 
Regulatory theory – my personal journey 
When I first started to research regulatory issues in accounting, my initial views and pre-
conceptions were shaped by my university training as an economist.  I viewed regulation as 
being primarily about costs and benefits, although I did accept that many of these could not in 
fact be measured with any degree of reliability.  As I began to investigate real world 
regulatory structures related to accounting I quickly realised that they did not work in the way 
that economists usually assumed.  Regulatory delegation and fragmentation was normal and 
frequently an automatic system of control was replaced by a discretionary regime.  Also there 
were subtle and complex forces beyond costs and benefits (e.g. peer pressure, concern about 
personal reputation, perceptions) which influenced how regulators used their power and how 
regulatees responded.  Such issues were beyond the scope of economic welfare theories 
which therefore only provided a partial explanation for observed phenomena.  I realised it 
would be necessary to draw on insights from other disciplines such as sociology (e.g. 
Macdonald, 1995; Hancher and Moran, 1989) and psychology (e.g. Hirshleifer, 2008: 
Kohlberg, 1969) to explain what was actually happening, and these perspectives dominate the 
publications submitted.  I now appreciate that no grand theory of regulation exists or could 
ever exist because regulation is context specific and dynamic, responding to changes in 
structure, regulations, expectations and motivations.  
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Chapter three 
Financial Reporting Review Panel 
The relevant papers for this chapter are publications 1 to 6. 
Background to the project 
In the mid 1980s a recession in the UK brought some well publicised corporate failures and  
it was argued that accounting standards provided too many options and were not being 
adequately enforced (Griffiths, 1986).  Following a review by the profession it was proposed 
that the FRRP should be established to regulate compliance with accounting standards 
(CCAB, 1988) and it began operations in 1991.   
The FRRP was unique among international regulators as it was a reactive body responding to 
complaints rather than monitoring accounts for compliance, thereby keeping operating costs 
to a minimum.  It had the power to seek a court order requiring a company to remedy its 
accounts, however, its publicly stated preference was for voluntary agreement to be reached 
with directors (FRRP, 1993).  The FRRP issued a press notice where a problem had been 
identified and remedial action had been agreed with the company, but provided no 
information on cases which were investigated and subsequently dropped.  The FRRP had no 
direct powers over the auditors of the company involved but reported the case to the relevant 
audit firm’s regulatory body who would then consider whether further action was justified. 
By 1995 no research had been published on the activities of the FRRP and the ICAEW 
awarded a grant of £30,000 to R. Brandt, S. Fearnley and T. Hines to study ‘The impact of 
the Financial Reporting Review Panel on preparers and users of financial statements’.  
Research methods 
A variety of research methods were used on the project, thereby facilitating a triangulation 
approach.  A first stage was to analyse the secondary data (e.g. FRRP annual reports, relevant 
company accounts, press notices, press coverage, share price data) that was available in order 
to gain an understanding of the nature of its activities and external impact.   
Questionnaire survey data was used in order to gauge the FRRP’s impact.  Publication 1 
includes the results of a survey of listed company finance directors, audit partners and 
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financial journalists on their perceptions of the impact of the FRRP on the integrity of the 
financial reporting process relative to other recent regulatory changes.  Publication 4 
includes the results of a survey sent to the compliance partners in all UK audit firms with 
clients who fell within the FRRP’s remit, exploring how the existence of the FRRP had 
influenced the audit firm’s attitude to compliance. 
The prime research method used in the project (for publications 3 to 6) was semi-structured 
interviews with those with direct experience of dealing with the FRRP in cases that had 
resulted in a press notice.  The purpose of the interviews was to gain detailed insights into the 
interactions of directors and auditors with the FRRP. Eleven company interviewees and four 
audit firm partners agreed to be interviewed and all were recorded and then transcribed or 
extensive notes were taken.   A coding scheme was established, themes were identified from 
the data and then tabulated summaries were used to identify patterns across cases (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967).  For publication 4 additional interviews were undertaken with senior 
regulators and technical partners in audit firms.  
Contribution to the literature 
Publication 1 primarily draws on publicly available information about the FRRP to draw 
some preliminary conclusions about the way it operates and its wider impact. A number of 
the cases picked up by the FRRP would not have been considered material issues by auditors. 
All the outcomes were the result of voluntary agreements and it became clear that it was in 
nobody’s interest to pursue a case to the courts since it would just prolong the period of 
uncertainty.  The impact on auditors was more serious as they risked economic and reputation 
damage and possible disciplinary action from professional bodies.  The FRRP’s existence 
may have encouraged auditors to put pressure on clients not to breach regulations.  The 
survey suggested that it had a positive impact on financial reporting quality but had cost very 
little. 
Many of these themes were developed further in publication 4 which had the overall 
objectives of evaluating the contribution that the FRRP had made to the effectiveness of the 
regulatory framework for financial reporting in the UK and to consider how well placed it 
was to adapt to future challenges.  
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Concerns emerged from interviewees about the lack of substance in some of the cases that the 
FRRP dealt with and there was evidence that the FRRP was inclined towards compliance 
breaches rather than issues of substance involving judgement.  Also the FRRP’s view on 
materiality was different from that applied by practitioners.  Interview evidence confirmed 
that auditors had good reasons to avoid an FRRP case and the survey evidence indicated that 
its existence had changed attitudes to compliance and that the larger audit firms used its 
existence as a negotiating tool with clients.  Drawing on interview and questionnaire evidence 
there was only moderate support for a change in the FRRP’s terms of reference.  However, 
the monograph argued that the only way to end the criticisms that the FRRP deals with trivia 
is to move to pro-active monitoring of accounts.  
Publication 5 uses institutional theory to compare the stated aims, objectives and operating 
procedures of the FRRP with the practical experience of those who have been involved with 
it and evidence of the wider impact of their work.  The aim was to provide a richer 
understanding of the way in which a new institution achieves its objectives and to determine 
the extent to which it has engaged in ‘myth –making’ to establish and maintain its legitimacy.   
Institutional theorists observe that organisations need to respond to social expectations, that 
they exist in a social environment with prevalent norms. Failure to respond may threaten their 
survival (e.g. Fogarty, 1996).  Ritti and Silver (1986) argue that to establish legitimacy in the 
early stages of development, an agency will engage in ‘myth making’, likely to dramatise its 
role.  Even when established agencies need to maintain legitimacy.  It has been suggested that 
the internal workings of an organisation may be loosely coupled with its external image 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  The FRRP has few measurable outputs which can be used as a 
basis for evaluating success, but gives an account of its activities every year in the annual 
report.  Systematic text analysis was carried out on the annual reports to identify sentences in 
which the FRRP (or their parent body, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC)) reflected on 
their operating procedures, achievements or their place in the broader UK regulatory 
framework.  These were the source of potential myths which were then evaluated against 
interview evidence from those with direct experience of the FRRP. 
The paper concludes that there was some evidence that the FRRP had engaged in ‘myth 
making’ in order to gain social legitimacy.  For example, it had a considerable amount of 
discretion which was exercised in an unpredictable way, when the FRRP stated that decisions 
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are driven by technical and rational considerations.    There were some suggestions that 
easier, less material cases were taken up to demonstrate a level of activity, but this was not 
consistent with its portrayal as a crusading agency.  Interviewees were taken aback by the 
formality of the meetings and felt under-prepared, when the FRRP described its processes as 
open, fair and informal.  Given that the FRRP was unique among global enforcement 
agencies in being a private sector regulator, purely reactive and unable to use stock exchange 
based sanctions, myths become important in maintaining credibility. 
An indication of the contribution that this project made to knowledge and the academic 
development of the discipline can be gained by a review of citations for publication 5 (the 
publication with the greatest number of citations among those submitted).  As Dillard, Rigsby 
and Goodman (2004) note the theoretical perspective used in the paper, institutional theory, 
has subsequently been employed in a number of accounting settings which share some of the 
FRRP’s characteristics (e.g. they need to meet social expectations in order to maintain 
legitimacy).  The paper has been cited by researchers exploring the Australian National Audit 
Office (ANAO) (Wade, 2008; Funnell and Wade, 2012), the corporation tax planning 
function in US multinational companies (Mulligan, 2008), non-governmental organisations in 
Tanzania non-governmental organisations in Tanzania (Goddard and Assad, 2006), a 
religious / charitable organisation in Australia (Irvine, 2003a), a nation state facing the 
decision to adopt IFRS (Irvine, 2008) and the adoption of double entry bookkeeping at the 
Royal Treasury, Portugal in the eighteenth century (Gomes, 2007). 
Other citations are focussed on the research methods employed in publication 5.  Malik, Liu 
and Kyriacou (2011) and Barone, Ranamagar and Solomon (2011)  referred to the interview 
based research methods in publication 5 as a justification for their own approach, with  
Herrbach (2005) making specific reference to the number of interviews undertaken.  Samkin 
and Schneider (2008) cite the paper as an example of textual analysis software being 
employed.  Irvine (2003b) refers to it when exploring the issue of confidentiality in an 
organisational research project noting that in publication 5 some potential interviewees 
withdrew after initially agreeing to take part.  Gurd (2008) includes the paper as one of 23 
accounting publications to use grounded theory in his analysis of the extent to which 
researchers use a consistent approach. 
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Other citations relate specifically to the findings of publication 5 on accounting standard 
enforcement.  Peasnell, Pope and Young (2001) analyse the characteristics of firms subject to 
adverse rulings by the FRRP, while acknowledging the contribution of publication 5 in 
studying the FRRP’s processes.  It has also had an impact on comparative international 
studies on enforcement, for example the UK and Australia (Brown and Tarca, 2007), Spain 
and Portugal (Canibano and Alberto, 2008) and Spain and the UK (Canibano and Heras, 
2007), while Brown and Tarca (2005) cite the publication in their evaluation of existing 
enforcement methods just prior to IFRS.  The finding that the FRRP’s approach tends to be 
compliance based is used by Evans (2003) to argue that this will be one of the factors which 
limits the practical significance of the true and fair override.  Livne and McNichols (2009) 
use the same finding to support the argument that managers would calculate the costs and 
benefits of invoking the true and fair override and that given the FRRP’s approach to 
compliance, a departure from accounting standards might be expected to produce a regulatory 
intervention. 
Other papers focus on the wider effects of FRRP actions.  Publication 2 investigates whether 
press notices issued by the FRRP had an adverse impact on the share prices of the company 
concerned.  This was the first published study to review the FRRP’s pronouncements.  A 
share price event study was carried out on 33 companies which had been the subject of FRRP 
press notices up to December 1996.  No evidence was found of abnormal adverse price 
reactions following the publication of the press notice.  This suggested that either the contents 
were already known by the market or it did not consider the new information sufficiently 
significant to cause a reappraisal of share prices.  
Publication 6 explores the question of why auditors believe that independence has been 
enhanced and attitudes to compliance changed as a result of FRRP activities. While earlier 
papers (e.g. publication 4) were reliant on broadly based evidence, this paper used evidence 
from individuals with direct experience of the FRRP who are better placed to explain why its 
existence may have changed beliefs.   
Independent behaviour may be determined by decisions made by individual partners in 
dealing with clients and there is evidence that their individual level of cognitive development 
is a key influence on behaviour.  The paper refers to Kohlberg’s stage sequence model 
(Kohlberg, 1969) which identifies three different levels of cognitive moral development – 
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pre-conventional (will follow independence standards when in best interest), conventional 
(behaviour consistent with group norms) and post-conventions (will comply if consistent with 
internal beliefs).  This model has previously been applied in an audit setting by Ponemon and 
Gabhart (1990) and is utilised in this paper.  
The consequences of an FRRP inquiry for the audit firm were likely to depend on the nature 
of the advice given to the client in advance of the FRRP.  Directors expected their auditors to 
be technically competent, keeping them clear of regulatory interventions, and when this was 
brought into question, trust could be eroded.     Audit firms tended to give additional support 
to clients involved in FRRP inquiries and such costs were often not recoverable.   Other costs 
to an audit partner were personal embarrassment, increased risk of loss of client, possible 
career damage and the risk of an ICAEW disciplinary inquiry.  However, the FRRP was 
found to provide auditors with an additional negotiating tool in dealing with directors, thus 
making it easier for directors at the conventional and post conventional levels of ethical 
cognition to prevent non-compliance.  It also provided incentives for auditors at pre-
conventional levels of ethical cognition to be independent, as there was an increased risk of 
being caught.   
Publication 3 reviews one aspect of the disincentives for auditors identified in publication 6 
– investigation by the professional body responsible for regulating the audit firm.  Where the 
FRRP identified a defect in a set of accounts, the case was drawn to the attention of the 
relevant professional body, the ICAEW.  Although it had regularly expressed support for the 
work of the FRRP, no disciplinary action against an auditor was taken by the ICAEW for the 
first seven years of the its existence. The objective of the paper was to explain the ICAEW’s 
profile for disciplinary actions arising from FRRP cases drawing on publicly available data 
and interview evidence drawing on the professions literature.   
The anomalies arose because state delegated audit regulations were grafted onto the existing 
ICAEW disciplinary regime.  It appears that the ICAEW treated the FRRP cases as 
professional misconduct associated with a higher burden of proof, thereby protecting its 
members’ interests. Following discussions with the relevant government department a new 
approach was adopted in 1999 and disciplinary action was begun in three cases, completely 
inconsistent with previous decisions.  The paper concludes that regulatory fragmentation is 
the cause of the problem and that a more coherent regime was required.  
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Chapter four 
Introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
The relevant papers for this chapter are publications 7 to 8. 
Background to the project 
In June 2002 the European Union Council of Ministers approved a regulation (EU, 2002) 
requiring that all EU companies listed on a regulated stock exchange should prepare their 
consolidated accounts in accordance with international accounting standards (subsequently  
IFRS) by 2005.  This was a major change to the UK accounting regime. The aim of the study 
was to explore how a group of knowledgeable UK regulators, audit partners and company 
directors viewed this change and how those views evolved over time.    
Research methods 
The prime research method used in the project (for publications 7 and 8) was qualitative 
analysis of data from 23 semi-structured interviews conducted in two rounds.  The first took 
place between December 2001 and March 2002.  The second took place between December 
2003 and February 2004.  For publication 8 this was augmented by an analysis of publicly 
available data (i.e. responses to the Accounting Standards Board’s (ASB’s) consultations on 
the future of financial reporting for non-listed entities).   
Contribution to the literature 
Drawing on interview evidence, publication 7 reviews the move to convergence in the light 
of interest group theory which assumes that all parties, including regulators, act in a self 
interested way.  Hancher and Moran (1989) term a particular regulatory process as a defined 
space in which occupants or leading players move and interact.    
While there were plenty of anticipated benefits of convergence, this was tempered by regret 
at the loss of UK GAAP, believed to be of a high standard.  There was growing concern 
about the impact of the International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB’s) convergence 
project with US GAAP on IFRS.  Also a belief that smaller listed companies might not have 
the resources to manage the changeover effectively and that there may be an increased risk of 
misleading statements during the transition period.   Interpretation and enforcement were 
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other aspects of the transition which interviewees considered problematic and likely to read 
to EU wide differences, although there was agreement that enforcement should operate at the 
national level. 
The regulatory space with respect to global harmonisation was very crowded with the IASB, 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Big Four (also major change agents 
through their technical expertise and global reach) seen as the most influential.  Inevitably 
other players were likely to suffer a loss of influence. 
Publication 8 specifically focuses on the development of attitudes towards financial 
reporting solutions for entities not covered by the Regulation (EU, 2002).    Although this 
group of entities was initially given the choice of remaining on UK GAAP or moving to 
IFRS, the ASB’s initial view was that in the medium term there was no case for two sets of 
standards (ASB, 2004) and they therefore proposed to converge UK GAAP with IFRS. 
Following criticism this strategy was subsequently revised.  
  
The increasing perception from interview evidence and responses to the ASB’s revised 
strategy was that IFRS was overly complex and was complicating the search for an 
appropriate form of financial reporting for entities not covered by the requirement to produce 
IFRS based accounts.  Arguably the real needs of SMEs were ignored in the debates 
dominated by the requirements of global players and progress has been painfully slow.  The 
IASB’s reporting model is based on the concept of decision usefulness. Arguably this is 
inappropriate for small companies who lack accounting expertise, may be owner managed 
and whose accounts are read by few (Carsberg, Page, Sindall and Waring, 1985; Keasey and 
Short, 1990).  The implications were that further, possibly more radical, policy options 
needed to be considered for smaller companies to ensure that the costs of financial reporting 
remain in proportion to the benefits. 
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Chapter five 
Impact of post- Enron re-regulation 
The relevant papers for this chapter are publications 9 to 12.  
Background to the project 
The first objective of the project was to identify the key financial reporting issues which were 
discussed and negotiated between APs, CFOs and ACCs, and also to establish how they 
reached agreement on the final outcome.  The second objective was to investigate the nature 
of the issues that influenced the relationship between the three parties and, in particular, to 
establish whether auditors were able to resist pressure from the directors.  No empirical 
studies had been carried out to answer these questions in the regulatory environment created 
by the post-Enron regulatory reforms and increased international harmonisation.  The third 
objective was to investigate whether, as a result of the changes, audit quality had improved.   
The project was re-visiting a previous study undertaken by Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt 
(2001) conducted ten years earlier in a rather different regulatory environment.  Arguably the 
most significant subsequent regulatory change was in corporate governance with additional 
responsibility given to ACs following the report from the Smith Committee (2003).  They 
now were expected to take responsibility for recommending the appointment or re-
appointment of auditors to the board and the shareholders, approval of non-audit services and 
overseeing auditor independence and monitoring the integrity of the financial statements. 
Auditors were expected to engage with the audit committee (APB, 2004).  However the 
previous ten years had brought in many other changes to the UK which might be expected to 
impact on the issues under review.  On the accounting side IFRS was introduced for the 
group accounts of EU listed companies for December 2005 year ends onwards and the 
FRRP’s remit changed from being purely reactive to complaints to proactively reviewing 
public interest company accounts.  In audit, responsibility for supervising the setting of 
auditing and ethical standards was transferred to the FRC.  International Standards of 
Auditing (ISAs) amended for use in the UK were adopted in 2005 and ethical standards were 
also revised particularly with respect to non-audit services and audit partner rotation.  The 
Audit Inspection Unit (AIU) (under the aegis of the FRC) was set up to inspect public interest 
audits and issue public reports on their findings.   
24 
 
The results of the project are particularly relevant to policymakers who are once again 
reviewing the regulatory framework in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis.  In the 
aftermath of this, the nature of financial reporting and the role of the auditor had been 
questioned (e.g. EC, 2010).  There have been proposals to further enhance the role of the 
audit committee (FRC, 2011) yet little is known about their existing level of engagement. 
The Chartered Accountants’ Trustees supported this study with a research grant of £154,839 
in 2007. 
Research methods 
A two stage research method was employed.  First a questionnaire was sent to 500 CFOs and 
500 ACCs of UK listed companies, along with 500 APs from firms which audit listed 
companies.  Respondents were asked about financial reporting and auditing issues which had 
been discussed or negotiated in the course of finalising the last set of accounts.  The 
questionnaire also sought information on the activities of the AC and elicited beliefs on 
factors which undermine or enhance audit quality and the integrity of financial reporting.   
The second stage was to target nine companies and to interview both the CFO and the ACC, 
and to seek permission from the directors to interview the AP.  The interviews explored the 
interviewees’ experiences of interactions with the other key parties, as well as their 
perceptions of how changes in the regulatory framework had impacted on their role. The 
interviews were all recorded and transcribed.  The grounded theory methodology of Strauss 
and Corbin (1998) was employed whereby theory was built inductively from the data.  Key 
features in each text were coded, these were grouped into concepts that apply across cases.  
Similar concepts were further grouped into categories and the relationships between them 
were the basis of the final theory. 
Contribution to the literature 
Publication 9 is a response to a public statement from the House of Commons Treasury 
Committee which in 2009 expressed the view that ‘investor confidence and trust in audit 
would be enhanced by a prohibition on audit firms conducting non-audit work for the same 
company’ (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2009).  Drawing on results from the 
experiential survey and other publicly available data, the publication was able to contribute to 
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the debate.  It evaluates the extent to which post Enron regulatory changes have impacted on 
perceptions and behaviour regarding non-audit services (NAS) being supplied by the audit 
firm.   
The briefing draws on publicly available data and the questionnaire responses to provide 
evidence that the regulatory changes along with pressure from activist investors, have 
brought about significant reductions in the level of NAS supplied by audit firms.  The 
majority of ACs appear to be involved with the issue and 53% of respondents report that 
regulatory change has discouraged or prevented purchase of NAS.  There is evidence that the 
changes have also brought some unintended negative consequences.  The briefing concludes 
that the provision of services which most concern investors have already been restricted, and 
given the risk of further unintended consequences there appears to be little justification for 
further restrictions. 
The major part of publication 10 consists of nine company case studies where the 
researchers conducted face to face interviews with CFOs, ACCs and APs of companies with 
different attributes including size, industry sector and ownership structure.  The interviews 
explored the financial reporting and auditing interactions which had taken place and how 
each party perceived his or her role in the resolution of the issue.   
Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt (2001) conducted matched interviews with CFOs and APs in six 
major listed UK companies.  From the 24 distinct interaction issues identified, a grounded 
theory model was developed of the negotiation process and factors that influence the nature 
of the outcome of interactions.  The model identified layers of influences covering context 
specific to that interaction (e.g. nature of the issue, key third parties involved), then general 
company / audit firm context (quality of primary relationship, company circumstances, firm 
circumstances and company buyer type), next the external national climate and finally the 
global regulatory climate.  This study did not explore the role of audit committees and field 
work was undertaken in a very different regulatory environment.  
 This study tested the grounded theory generated by Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt (2001) and 
the cross-case analysis demonstrated that it was no longer a valid framework to explain 
interactions in the new regulatory setting and that it would be necessary to develop a revised 
grounded theory interaction model.  The strongest outcome determinant is now the regulatory 
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regime and particularly the national regime for enforcing accounting (FRRP) and auditing 
(AIU) standards which had been strengthened post-Enron.  The revised corporate governance 
codes and ethical standards were also strong influences.  The contextual factors which had 
been significant in shaping interactions in Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt (2001) had become of 
peripheral importance.      
The book provides evidence that ACCs, given additional responsibilities under revised 
corporate governance codes, are fully engaged with the financial reporting process.  The 
ACC personally takes on much of the monitoring role formally assigned to the audit 
committee, while the audit committee most often fulfils a ceremonial role.  The predominant 
dynamic in financial reporting interactions has shifted to a triad relationship where both the 
CFO and AP are accountable to the ACC, who manages the AC.  Consequently, interactions 
now tend to be characterised by a shared objective of complying with the rules, problem-
solving behaviour and rarely by disagreement and confrontation.   
The outcome of all the compliance issues was classified as compliant and all the judgment 
outcomes were classified as acceptable.  This is in sharp contrast with the interactions 
presented in Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt (2001) where four of the 22 outcomes were 
considered poor or examples of creative compliance.  The existence of accounting standards 
which are more rules-based often made agreement on compliance issues easier.  Some 
concerns were expressed regarding the effect of recent regulatory innovations and given an 
effective enforcement regime, it is the quality of the standards and regulations being enforced 
that will determine the quality of the final outcomes. 
Publication 11 adds to the evidence on audit committee engagement as, using survey data, it 
investigates the involvement of the AC, the ACC, AP and the CFO in relation to a range of 
audit-related matters in UK listed companies in the 2007 regulatory environment.  In 
particular the level of engagement of AC and ACC were explored with respect to AC 
responsibilities identified in the Combined Code, along with the level of awareness and 
involvement of the AC and ACC with a range of audit related issues. The research used the 
experiential questionnaire survey which was the first wide-ranging survey to be carried out in 
any jurisdiction that explores the levels of engagement of the ACC, AC, AP and CFO in audit 
related issues. 
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The level of AC and ACC engagement in seven AC responsibilities set by the Combined 
Code is high and the findings indicated that ACCs were fully aware of interactions taking 
place.  However, only 50% of sixteen audit planning, performance and finalisation matters 
were routinely discussed. The ACC acted without the full AC in 11% of discussions, while 
25% discussions involved only the CFO and AP without the ACC or the AC.  ACC 
involvement was affected by the nature of the issue. The extent of discussion and the degree 
of AC and ACC involvement was influenced by background characteristics – company size, 
audit firm size and ACC experience and qualifications. 
This evidence of less than full AC engagement with audit related issues suggests that 
regulators may risk creating an AC expectations gap if AC duties under the extant model are 
significantly increased without structural change.  
Publication 12 uses the survey data to identify the extent to which key preparer groups 
believe that key features of the regulatory framework (including recent reforms) enhance or 
undermine audit quality and investigates the congruence of these group’s views.  It also 
identifies the changes considered most likely to improve audit quality. 
The majority of factors were rated as slightly or moderately enhancing audit quality.  All 
groups rate various audit committee interactions with auditors among the factors most 
enhancing audit quality.  However, ISAs and the audit inspection regime were viewed as less 
effective.  There are significant differences between groups for the majority of factors.   
Respondents commented that aspects of the changed regime were largely process and 
compliance driven, with high costs for limited benefits, a finding consistent with regulatory 
over-reaction.    Overall the lack of impact of many of the regulatory changes, along with the 
concern from respondents that many aspects of the changed regime were process or 
compliance driven, is consistent with Hirshleifer’s (2008) psychological bias theory of 
regulation which suggests that there is over confidence that a useful regulatory intervention 
exists.   
In the wake of the financial crisis there has been a fresh debate about the appropriate form of 
future regulation over financial reporting and audit.  The evidence produced by this research 
has informed and influenced this public policy debate, particularly with respect to the role of 
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auditors, audit committees and audit committee chairs. Furthermore aspects of the research 
have influenced practices in the audit industry at global level.  Specifically: 
1. The national technical partner from one of the Big Four global audit firms provided a 
statement which argued that this research had more impact upon their auditing 
processes than any other research in almost twenty years.  Specifically the results of 
the research had helped him appreciate the extent to which the latter stages of a 
statutory audit focused on disclosures in the annual report rather than key numbers in 
the primary financial statements and therefore he initiated changes in the firm’s audit 
procedures. 
2. The research team was invited to present findings at the Audit Quality Forum, 
(convened by ICAEW’s Audit and Assurance Faculty) on two occasions.  The first, to 
provide an overview of the survey results included in publication 10, the second 
focussed on the findings of publication 9. 
3. I was invited to join the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland’s (ICAS) 
working party on non-audit services which had been set up following the second 
Audit Quality Forum presentation.   
4. The research team was invited by the Centre for Business Performance at the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) to deliver the annual P D 
Leake Lecture at Chartered Accountants' Hall in London to a professional / academic 
audience.  The content formed the basis of publication 11. 
5. The research team provided written evidence on the role of audit in capital markets, 
and the adverse impact of IFRS to the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic 
Affairs drawing on survey data.   Citations appear in the final report (House of Lords, 
2011, paras 20, 113 and 139). 
The above have formed the basis of an impact case which is currently under consideration for 
inclusion in Portsmouth Business School’s 2013 REF submission. 
Further papers from this project are still in the course of development.  For example, one 
paper explores the involvement of ACs and ACCs on financial reporting interactions using 
survey data.  Another paper will focus on perceptions of UK regulatory enforcement. 
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Conclusion 
This commentary articulates a series of refereed papers within the broad framework of 
regulation, focussing on three distinct initiatives – the establishment of the Financial Review 
Panel, the adoption of IFRS and the impact of post- Enron regulation on behaviour and 
perceptions.  A total of twelve publications have been submitted, all published in refereed 
journals or other high quality outputs.  Most of the publications have provided the first 
evidence on a particular regulatory initiative and all have made a significant contribution to 
theory and / or knowledge. 
Publications 1 to 6 together provide a coherent view on how a newly established private 
sector body with limited powers delegated from government and a limited budget achieves its 
aim to be an effective enforcement agency.  The papers cover its impact on auditors, share 
price reaction, perceptions of those with and without direct experience of it and the response 
of professional bodies responsible for regulating auditors.  Publication 5 used institutional 
theory as a lens through which to explore whether the FRRP engaged in ‘myth-making’ in 
order to establish and maintain legitimacy.  The paper has been widely cited (see table 1) and 
the theory employed in many other settings where there is a need to meet social expectations 
in order to maintain legitimacy.  It has also had an impact on other international studies on 
enforcement (e.g. Brown and Tarca, 2007) and contributed to the debate about the status of 
the true and fair override (e.g. Evans, 2003). 
The IFRS publications identified at a very early stage some of the continuing problems 
associated with IFRS adoption.  They also employ the concept of regulatory space (Hancher 
and Moran, 1989) to develop a theoretical framework for ‘global’ regulation generated by a 
supra-national body outside of national jurisdictions.     
Publications 9 to 12 have highlighted how a change in regulatory framework can transform 
behaviours and perceptions of key players.  They provide evidence on the role taken by the 
audit committee as a whole and the audit committee chair as an individual within the new 
framework.  Publication 10 develops a new grounded theory to explain how financial 
reporting issues are resolved in the revised UK regulatory environment when it becomes clear 
that the previously developed theory (Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt, 2001) is no longer valid.  
Publication 12 draws on Hirsheifer’s (2008) psychological bias theory to explain why most 
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of the post-Enron regulatory initiatives are perceived by key groups as only marginally 
enhancing audit quality.      
The work undertaken has been policy relevant and has impacted on practice. Most of the 
proposals on the FRRP’s future role included in publication 4 were subsequently 
implemented.  Publications 9 to 12 have been presented to professional audiences, changed 
audit procedures in a Big Four firm and formed the basis of written evidence to, and been 
cited by, the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs. 
All of the submitted publications have been jointly authored.  Key ideas concerning the 
development of the projects were usually a matter of discussion between all research team 
members.  My specific contribution to each paper has varied (see appendix 2) but in broad 
terms I have, provided the research team with financial reporting expertise both pre and post 
IFRS, undertaken some of the literature reviews, jointly conducted most of the interviews and 
collected other publicly available data, been primarily responsible for most of the qualitative 
analysis and had prime responsibility of developing and writing the first draft of some of the 
papers and sections of the longer publications.   
The regulatory framework for accounting and auditing is constantly evolving in response to 
new challenges and creating new research opportunities.  I intend to continue to make a 
significant contribution to future debates on regulation.   
 
 
31 
 
References 
ASB (2004), ‘UK Accounting Standards: A Strategy for Convergence with IFRS’, London: 
Accounting Standards Board. 
APB (2004), ‘ISA (UK and Ireland) 260.  Communication of Audit Matters with those 
Charged with Governance’, London: Auditing Practices Board. 
Akerlof, G. A. (1970), ‘The market for “lemons”: quality uncertainty and the market 
mechanism’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3), 488-500. 
Ayres, I. and Braithwaite, J. (1992), ‘Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation 
Debate’, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Baldwin, R.  and Cave, M. (1999), ‘Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and 
Practice’, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Baldwin, R., Cave, M. and Lodge, M. (2010), ‘The Oxford Handbook of Regulation’, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Black, J. (2002), ‘Regulatory conversations’, ‘Journal of Law and Society’, 29, 163-196. 
Funnell, W. and Wade, M. (2012), ‘Negotiating the credibility of performance auditing’, 
Critical Perspectives of Accounting, 23, 434-450. 
Barone, E., Ranamagar, N. and Solomon, J.F. ‘A Habermasian model of stakeholder (non) 
engagement and corporate (ir) responsibility accounting,’ Accounting Forum, 
http://dx.doi/10.1016/j.accfor.2012.12.001. 
Beattie, V. and Fearnley, S. (2002), ‘Auditor Independence and Non-audit service: a 
literature review’, London: The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. 
Beattie, V. Fearnley, S. and Brandt, R. (2001), ‘Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit 
is Really About’, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Becker, G. S. (1968), ‘Crime and punishment: an economic approach’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 76, 169. 
Becker, G. S. (1985), ‘Public policies, pressure groups, and deadweight costs’, Journal of 
Public Economics, 28, 329-347. 
Breyer, S. (1982), ‘Regulation and its Reform’, Harvard: Harvard University Press. 
Brown, P. and Tarca, A. (2005), ‘A commentary of issues relating to the enforcement of 
International Financial Reporting Standard in the EU’, European Accounting Review, 14 (1), 
181-212. 
Brown, P. and Tarca, A. (2005), ‘Achieving high quality, comparable financial reporting: A 
review of independent enforcement bodies in Australia and the United Kingdom’, Abacus, 43 
(4), 438-473. 
Cadbury Report (1992), ‘Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance’, London: Gee and Co. 
32 
 
Canibano, L. and Alberto, F. (2008), ‘El control institucional de la informacion financiera: 
aplicacion de un studio DELPHI’, Revista Espanola de Financiacion y Contabilidad, 37 
(140), 795-829. 
Canibano, L. and Heras, E. (2007), ‘Enforcement in the European Union- A Comparative 
Study: Spain and the UK’,  Autonomous University of Madrid Working Paper. 
Carsberg, B. V., Page, M. J., Sindall, A. J. and Waring, I. D. (1985), ‘Small Company 
Financial Reporting’, London: Prentice-Hall International. 
Combined Committee of Accounting Bodies (CCAB) (1988), ‘The Making of Accounting 
Standards (The Dearing Report)’, London: CCAB. 
Dillard, J. F., Rigsby, J. T. and Goodman, C. (2004), ‘The making and remaking of 
organization context: Duality and the institutionalization process’, Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 17 (4), 506-542. 
Donabedian, B. (1993), ‘Accounting self-regulation and the enforcement of professional 
codes’, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 12, 87-112. 
European Commission (EC) (2010), ‘Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis,’ Brussels: 
European Commission.  
EU (2002), ‘Regulation (EC) 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the Application of International Accounting Standards’, Brussels: European Commission. 
Evans, L. (2003), ‘The true and fair view and the ‘fair presentation’ override of IAS 1’, 
Accounting and Business Research, 33 (4), 311-325. 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) (2011), ‘Effective Company Stewardship: Enhancing 
Corporate Reporting and Audit’, London: FRC. 
Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) (1993), ‘Procedures for Handling Individual 
Cases’, London: Financial Reporting Council. 
Fogarty, T. J. (1996), ‘The imagery and reality of peer review in the US: insights from 
institutional theory’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 21 (2/3), 243-267. 
Fogarty, T. J., Zucca, L., Meonske, N. and Kirch, D. (1997), ‘Proactive practice review: a 
critical case of accounting regulation that never was’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 8, 
162-187. 
Funnell, W. and Wade, M. (2012), ‘Negotiating the credibility of performance auditing’, 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 23, 434-450. 
Glaser, B. G. and Strauss. A. L. (1967), ‘The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research’, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co. 
Goddard, A. and Assad, M.J. (2006), ‘Accounting and navigating legitimacy in Tanzanian 
NGOs’, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 19 (3), 377-404. 
33 
 
Gomes, D. (2007), ‘Accounting Change in Central Government: the Institutionalization of 
Double Entry Bookkeeping at the Portuguese Royal Treasury (1761-1777)’, Universidade do 
Minho working paper. 
Griffiths, I. (1986), ‘Creative Accounting: How to Make Your Profits What You Want them to 
Be’, London: Urwin.  
Gunningham, N. and Grabosky, P. (1999), ‘Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental 
Policy’, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gurd, B. (2008), ‘Remaining consistent with method? An analysis of grounded theory 
research in accounting’, Qualitative Research in Accounting and Management, 5 (2), 122-
138. 
Hancher, L. and Moran, M. (1989), ‘Organising regulatory space’ in Hancher, L. and Moran, 
M. (eds) Capitalism, Culture and Regulation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Herrbach, O. (2005), ‘The art of compromise? The individual and organisational legitimacy 
of “irregular auditing”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 18 (3), 390-409. 
Hirshleifer, D. (2008), ‘Psychological bias as a driver of financial regulation’, European 
Financial Management, 14 (5), 845-874. 
House of Commons Treasury Committee (2009), ‘Banking Crisis: Reforming Corporate 
Governance and Pay in the City’, Ninth report of the session 2008/9 HC 519, 15 May, 
London: The Stationery Office.  
House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs (2011), ‘Auditors: Market 
Concentration and their Role’, Second report of the session 2010/11 HC 119, 30 March, 
London: The Stationery Office. 
Irvine, H. (2003a), ‘Taking a Closer Look: the why and how of New Accounting Practices in 
an Australian Religious / Charitable Organisation’, http://ro.uow.edu.au. 
Irvine, H. (2003b), ‘Trust me! A personal account of confidentiality issues in an 
organisational research project’, Accounting Forum, 27, 111-131. 
Irvine, H. (2008), ‘The global institutionalization of financial reporting: the case of the 
United Arab Emirates’, Accounting Forum, 32 (2), 125-142. 
Keasey, K. and Short, H. (1990), ‘The accounting burdens facing small firms: an empirical 
research note’, Accounting & Business Research, 20, 307-313. 
Kohlberg, L. (1969), ‘Stages and sequences: the cognitive developmental approach to 
socialisation’, in D. Goslin (ed.), Handbook of Socialisation Theory and Research, Chicago: 
Rand McNally. 
Livne, G. and McNichols, M. (2009), ‘ An empirical investigation of the True and Fair View 
Override in the United Kingdom’, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 36 (1-2), 1-
30. 
Macdonald, K. M. (1995), ‘The Sociology of Professions’, London: Sage.  
34 
 
Malik, A., Liu, J. and Kyriacou, O. (2011), ‘Creative accounting practice and business 
performance: evidence from Pakistan’, Business Performance Management, 12 (3), 228-241. 
Meyer, J. W. and Rowan, B. (1977), ‘Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth 
and ceremony’, American Journal of Sociology, 83 (2), 340-363. 
Mulligan, E. (2008), ‘Tax Planning in Practice: a Field Study of US Multinational 
Corporations,’ http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1113/. 
Musgrave, R. A. (1969), ‘Provision of social goods’ in Margolis, Julius and Guitton  H. 
(eds.), Public Economics, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 124-145. 
Nobes, C. and Parker, R. H. (2001), ‘Comparative International Accounting’, London: 
Prentice Hall. 
Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P. F. and Young, S. (2001), ‘The characteristics of firms subject to 
adverse rulings by the Financial Reporting Review Panel’, Accounting and Business 
Research, 31 (4), 291-311. 
Ponemon, L. A. and Gabhart, D. R. L. (1990), ‘Auditor independence judgements: a 
cognitive-development model and experimental evidence’, Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 7 (1), 227-251. 
Posner, R. A. (1974), ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’, Bell Journal of Economics, 5, 335-
358. 
Puxty, A. G., Wilmott, H., Cooper, D. and Lowe, T. (1987), ‘Modes of regulation in 
advanced capitalism: locating accountancy in four countries’, Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 12, 273-292.  
Ritti, R. and Silver, J. (1986), ‘Early processes of institutionilization: the dramaturgy of 
exchange in interorganisational relations’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 31, 25. 
Samkin, G. and Schneider, A. (2008)’, ‘Adding scientific rigour to qualitative data analysis: 
an illustrative example’, Qualitative Research in Accounting and Management, 5 (3), 207-
238. 
Smith Committee (2003), ‘Audit Committee Combined Code Guidance’, London: Financial 
Reporting Council. 
Stigler, G. J. (1971), ‘The theory of economic regulation’, The Bell Journal of Economics, 2 
(1), 3-21. 
Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. (1998), ‘Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and 
Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory’, Second Edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Wade, M. J. (2008), ‘The Credibility of ANAO Performance Audit’, http://ro.uow.edu 
.au/theses/1913. 
35 
 
Appendix One 
Publications submitted for the award 
(1) Brandt, R., Fearnley, S., Hines, T. and Beattie, V. (1997) “The Financial Reporting 
Review Panel:  An analysis of its activities” in Financial Reporting Today – Current and 
Emerging Issues 1998.   London: Accountancy Publications, 27-54. 
 (2) Hines, T., McBride, K. and Page, M. (1999) “An investigation into the stock market 
reaction to press notices issued by the Financial Reporting Review Panel.”  Journal of 
Applied Accounting Research, 5 (2), 54-83.  
(3) Fearnley S., Hines T., McBride K. and Brandt R. (2000) “Problems and politics of 
regulatory fragmentation:  The case of the Financial Reporting Review Panel and the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.”  Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance. 8 (1), 16-35.  
(4) Fearnley S., Hines T., McBride K., and Brandt R. (2000) “A Peculiarly British Institution.  
An Analysis of the Contribution Made by the Financial Reporting Review Panel to 
Accounting Compliance in the UK.”  London: Centre for Business Performance, Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.  
(5) Hines T., McBride K. and Fearnley S. (2001) “We’re off to see the wizard: An evaluation 
of directors’ and auditors’ experiences with the Financial Reporting Review Panel.”  
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability, 14 (1), 53-84. 
(6) Fearnley S., Hines T., McBride K. and Brandt R. (2002) “The impact of the Financial 
Reporting Review Panel on aspects of the independence of auditors and their attitudes to 
compliance in the UK.” British Accounting Review (34), 109-139. 
(7) Fearnley S., Gillies A., Hines T. and Willett C. (2007) “Bewildered but better informed: A 
qualitative, interview based study into the views of accountants and regulators prior to the 
introduction of IFRS in the UK.” Accepted for ICAEW website 
(http://www.icaew.com/index.cfm?route=112935 ). Retrieved 13 June 2007. 
(8) Fearnley S. and Hines T. (2007) “How IFRS has destabilised financial reporting for UK 
non-listed entities.” Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 15 (4), 394-408.  
 (9) Beattie V., Fearnley S. and Hines T. (2009) “The impact of changes to the non audit 
services regime on finance directors, audit committee chairs and audit partners of UK listed 
companies” London: Centre for Business Performance, ICAEW.  
(10) Beattie V., Fearnley S. and Hines T. (2011) “Reaching Key Financial Reporting 
Decisions: How Directors and Auditors Interact”, Chichester: Wiley. 
(11) Beattie V., Fearnley S. and Hines T. (2012) “Do UK audit committees really engage 
with auditors on audit planning and performance?” Accounting & Business Research, 42 (3), 
1-27. 
(12) Beattie V., Fearnley S. and Hines T. “Perceptions of actors affecting audit quality in the 
Post-Sox UK regulatory environment.” Accounting & Business Research, 43 (1), 56-81. 
36 
 
Appendix Two 
Personal contribution to the submitted papers 
The papers supporting this submission for a PhD by publication are listed below with an 
indication of my personal contribution to each.  These papers will be presented in 
chronological order to illustrate how the research has developed.  
(1) Brandt, R., Fearnley, S., Hines, T. and Beattie, V. (1997) “The Financial Reporting 
Review Panel:  An analysis of its activities” in Financial Reporting Today – Current and 
Emerging Issues 1998.   London: Accountancy Publications, 27-54. 
My contribution: I collected and analysed the publicly available data about the FRRP, its 
activities and its wider impact.  This was supplemented by questionnaire data from another 
project.  I was a joint contributor on the final draft. 
(2) Hines, T., McBride, K. and Page, M. (1999) “An investigation into the stock market 
reaction to press notices issued by the Financial Reporting Review Panel.”  Journal of 
Applied Accounting Research, 5 (2), 54-83.  
My contribution: I was jointly involved with the research design and collected the share 
price data.  I reviewed the literature and was lead author on drafting the paper.  
(3) Fearnley S., Hines T., McBride K. and Brandt R. (2000) “Problems and politics of 
regulatory fragmentation:  The case of the Financial Reporting Review Panel and the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.”  Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance. 8 (1), 16-35.  
My contribution: The FRRP project as a whole was jointly conceived.  I was involved in at 
least 80% of interviews, sometimes as sole interviewer and took the lead on the analysis of 
the interviews using NUDIST software.  I also obtained the relevant secondary data and 
helped to develop the paper. 
(4) Fearnley S., Hines T., McBride K., and Brandt R. (2000) “A Peculiarly British Institution.  
An Analysis of the Contribution Made by the Financial Reporting Review Panel to 
Accounting Compliance in the UK.”  London: Centre for Business Performance, Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.  
37 
 
My contribution: The FRRP project as a whole was jointly conceived. I collected and 
analysed most of the publicly available data.  I was involved in at least 80% of interviews, 
sometimes as sole interviewer.  I took the lead on the analysis of the interviews using 
NUDIST software.  I jointly designed the questionnaire and took responsibility for analysing 
it.  The publication was 87 pages long and contained seven chapters. I was responsible for 
developing and writing the first draft of three of the chapters and reviewed and commented 
on the others. 
(5) Hines T., McBride K. and Fearnley S. (2001) “We’re off to see the wizard: An evaluation 
of directors’ and auditors’ experiences with the Financial Reporting Review Panel.”  
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability, 14 (1), 53-84. 
My contribution: The FRRP project as a whole was jointly conceived.  I was involved in at 
least 80% of interviews, sometimes as sole interviewer, supplemented by a questionnaire 
survey.  I took the lead on the analysis of the interviews using NUDIST software and 
collected data from FRRP annual reports.  I also assumed prime responsibility for 
developing and writing this paper, including the literature review.  
(6) Fearnley S., Hines T., McBride K. and Brandt R. (2002) “The impact of the Financial 
Reporting Review Panel on aspects of the independence of auditors and their attitudes to 
compliance in the UK.” British Accounting Review (34), 109-139. 
My contribution: The FRRP project as a whole was jointly conceived.  I was involved in at 
least 80% of interviews, sometimes as sole interviewer, supplemented by a questionnaire 
survey.  I took the lead on the analysis of the interviews using NUDIST software and obtained 
the secondary data relevant for the paper. 
(7) Fearnley S., Gillies A., Hines T. and Willett C. (2007) “Bewildered but better informed: 
A qualitative, interview based study into the views of accountants and regulators prior to the 
introduction of IFRS in the UK.” Accepted for ICAEW website 
(http://www.icaew.com/index.cfm?route=112935 ). Retrieved 13 June 2007. 
My contribution: I was jointly responsible for developing the IFRS project.  I was present at 
all interviews conducted, was primarily responsible for analysing the data using NVIVO and 
38 
 
reviewing the literature in some of the relevant areas.  The publication was over 100 pages 
long and contained ten chapters.  I was primarily responsible for three of them. 
(8) Fearnley S. and Hines T. (2007) “How IFRS has destabilised financial reporting for UK 
non-listed entities.” Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 15 (4), 394-408.  
My contribution: I was jointly responsible for developing the IFRS project.  I was present at 
all interviews conducted, was primarily responsible for analysing the data using NVIVO and 
reviewing the literature in some of the relevant areas.  I was primarily responsible for the 
overall direction and first draft of the paper. 
(9) Beattie V., Fearnley S. and Hines T. (2009) “The impact of changes to the non audit 
services regime on finance directors, audit committee chairs and audit partners of UK listed 
companies” London: Centre for Business Performance, ICAEW.  
My contribution: I was jointly responsible for developing broad direction of the post Enron 
regulation project and also the content and design of questionnaires sent out to the three 
respondent groups. I analysed the relevant qualitative content of the questionnaire and 
jointly developed the bulletin.   
 (10) Beattie V., Fearnley S. and Hines T. (2011) “Reaching Key Financial Reporting 
Decisions: How Directors and Auditors Interact”, Chichester: Wiley. 
My contribution: I was jointly responsible for developing broad direction of the post Enron 
regulation project and also the questionnaires sent out to the three respondent groups.  I was 
jointly involved in all the interviews conducted and was primarily responsible for analysing 
the interview data.  The book is 349 pages long with 17 chapters and I was responsible for 
the first draft of the majority of case chapters (of which there were nine), the chapters on the 
regulatory framework and cross case analysis.  All chapters were jointly reviewed by the 
members of the research team. 
 (11) Beattie V., Fearnley S. and Hines T. (2012) “Do UK audit committees really engage 
with auditors on audit planning and performance?” Accounting & Business Research, 42 (3), 
1-27.  
 
39 
 
My contribution: I was jointly responsible for developing broad direction of the post Enron 
regulation project and also the content and design of questionnaires sent out to the three 
respondent groups.  I analysed the relevant qualitative questionnaire data.  While the 
research team jointly developed the paper, I was lead author on the literature review.  
 (12) Beattie V., Fearnley S. and Hines T. “Factors affecting audit quality in the Post-Sox UK 
regulatory environment: perceptions of chief financial officers, audit committee chairs and 
audit engagement partners” accepted for Accounting & Business Research 2012. 
My contribution: I was jointly responsible for developing broad direction of the post Enron 
regulation project and also the content and design of questionnaires sent out to the three 
respondent groups.  I also analysed the relevant qualitative questionnaire data.  The research 
team jointly developed the paper’s broad direction. I was lead author on the results section 
and the research team jointly edited the paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
Appendix Three 
Citations for each submitted publication 
 
 
 
 
